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ALBERTO ALESINA
REZA BAQIR
WILLIAM EASTERLY I
We present a model that links heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic
groups in a city to the amount and type of public goods the city supplies. We test
the implications of the model with three related data sets: U. S. cities, U. S.
metropolitan areas, and U. S. urban counties. Results show that the shares of
spending on productive public goods—education, roads, sewers and trash
pickup—in U. S. cities (metro areas/urhan counties) are inversely related to the
city's (metro area's/county's) ethnic fragmentation, even after controlling for other
socioeconomic and demographic determinants. We conclude that ethnic conflict is
an important determinant of local public finances.
"Many white Americans have turned against a strategy that
emphasizes programs they perceive as benefiting only racial
minorities.. .. Public services became identified mainly with
blacks, private services mainly with whites . . . white taxpay-
ers saw themselves as being forced, through taxes, to pay for
medical and legal services that many of them could not afford
.. ." from Wilson [1996, pp. 193, 202].
INTRODUCTION
When individuals have different preferences, they want to
pull fewer resources together for public projects. This paper
argues that certain public goods—such as education, roads,
sewers—supphed by U. S. cities are inversely related to ethnic
fragmentation in those cities. In cities where ethnic groups are
polarized, and where politicians have ethnic constituencies, the
share of spending that goes to public goods is low. Representatives
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of interest groups with an ethnic base are likely to value only the
benefits of public goods tbat accrue to tbeir groups, and discount
tbe benefits for otber groups. Tbis can bappen for two nonmutu-
ally exclusive reasons. One is tbat different ethnic groups bave
difFerent preferences over which type of public goods to produce
witb tax revenues. Tbe second is tbat eacb etbnic group's utility
level for a given public good is reduced if otber groups also use it.
Undervaluing public goods provision, political actors choose to
divert more public resources to private patronage.
Tbe finding of this paper is not that when a particular etbnic
group becomes a majority in a particular locality it lowers tbe
provision of public goods. In fact, it turns out tbat our results are
mainly driven by bow wbite majority cities react to varying
minority group sizes. The finding is tbat voters cboose lower
public goods wben a significant fraction of tax revenues collected
on one etbnic group are used to provide public goods sbared with
other ethnic groups.
Here is an anecdote. Prince George's (PG) County, a Maryland
county next to Washington, DC, used to bave a large white
majority. Afler the infiux of a large black middle class made the
county much more diverse (althougb whites were still in tbe
majority), PG voters passed a law called TRIM in 1978. TRIM puts
a legal ceiling on tbe property tax rate, a binding constraint on the
main source of revenue for school financing. Observers convention-
ally cite TRIM as one reason for poor schools in PG County. The
county next door to PG County is Montgomery County, also a DC
suburb. Montgomery is regionally (and even nationally) famous
for tbe quality of its public scbools. Montgomery bas a much
larger white majority and so is less ethnically diverse than PG.
Montgomery voters have decisively rejected tax limitation laws on
several occasions. Wbile Montgomery residents are 47 percent
ricber tban PG residents, on average, the disparity in public
schools appears to be greater tban can be explained by this income
difference. For example, Montgomery County collects 2.4 times
more local education revenue per pupil than does PG County.
It is hardly a new insight to argue tbat urban problems in
America have something to do witb ethnic confiiet. Conventional
wisdom particularly points to racial tension in public education.
However, we go well beyond tbis point and specifically document
how ethnic fragmentation infiuences local public goods, as re-PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1245
fleeted in the composition of spending, the aggregate total of
spending, and the budget balance.^
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews some of
the most relevant literature for our question. Section II develops a
simple model that illustrates the relationship between polariza-
tion of preferences and public goods provision. Section III presents
empirical evidence drawn from cities, metropolitan areas, and
urban counties. Section IV discusses many issues of sensitivity
analysis. The iast section concludes and indicates possibilities for
further research.
I. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Our paper crosses the boundaries of several branches of the
literature. First, we have a small (but rapidly growing) literature
that seeks to explain the formation of borders of political jurisdic-
tions as a function of diversity of individual preferences and
economies of scale in the financing of public goods. In particular,
the model ofthe present paper is related to the one by Alesina and
Spolaore 11997]. On the empirical side Easterly and Levine 11997]
report a strong negative correlation across countries between
ethnic diversity (as measured by language) and indicators of
public goods, such as numbers of telephones, percentage of roads
paved, efficiency ofthe electricity network, and years of schooling.
They conclude that ethnic diversity has something to do with
Africa's poor economic growth.^
Second, a burgeoning literature on income inequality de-
scribes how neighborhood segregation by class (which has a
strong ethnic dimension, although this is not emphasized by this
literature) can play havoc with the public provision of education.
Durlauf [19961 and Benabou [1996a] develop models that show
how city-suburb polarization is inefficient for human capital
accumulation with local school financing. However, attempts to
1. The problem of ethnic polarization is not limited to blacks versus whites. As
Wilson [1996] points out, "antagonism toward inner city blacks is frequently
expressed in the Latino neighborhoods that horder the new poverty areas." The
same author also emphasizes the Korean versus inner city hlacks tensions which
exploded in incidents in New York and Los Angeles,
2. They also find that financial repression is more severe and black market
premiums are higher in ethnically diverse countries. (As an aside, popular
discussion oflen compares troubled American cities with Third World countries.
The American international aid agency, USAID, even gave advice to Baltimore
about one kind of public goods supply—childhood immunization).1246 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
equalize spending in a polarized society only weaken support for
spending on schooling.*^
Several recent empirical papers on topics related to ours that
feature U. S. city data are those by Glaeser, Scheinkman, and
Shleifer [1995], Cutler and Glaeser [1995], Poterba [1996], Lutt-
mer [1997], and Goldin and Katz [1998]. Glaeser, Scheinkman,
and Shleifer find that one measure of city development—
population growth—is worse in cities with a higher percentage
non white population (although this effect weakens with unemploy-
ment and schooling controls). Cutler and Glaeser find that blacks
have worse outcomes on education, income, and other social
dimensions in more segregated metropolitan areas. Perhaps poor
public goods outcomes contribute to explaining these adverse
outcomes in racially polarized cities. Poterba finds that a larger
fraction of elderly in a jurisdiction leads to lower public spending
on education. Interestingly, and in accordance with the argument
of this paper, he also finds that "this reduction is particularly large
when the elderly residents and the school age population are from
diflferent racial groups."Cutler, Elmendorf, and Zeckhauser [1993]
find support for their hypothesis that people have "discriminatory
community preferences," where they only "care about the welfare
of others within their (ethnic) community" [P. 180]. Likewise,
Luttmer shows empirically that "individuals increase their sup-
port for welfare spending if a larger fraction of welfare recipients
in their area belongs to their racial group" [p. 1]. Goldin and Katz
study the period (early this century) in which universal and
pubhcly funded education became predominant in the United
States. They find that "more ethnic and religious homogeneity
fostered high school expansion from 1910 to 1930" [p. 1].
Third, a large local public finance literature inspired by
Tiebout's model bears on our topic, and focuses on the problem
that heterogeneity of citizens creates for public good provision
[Rubinfield 1987]. Tiebout's [1958] resolution ofthe heterogeneity
problem was that people can sort themselves into communities
that provide the public goods they want. However, subsequent
hterature has pointed out numerous problems with Tiebout
sorting, such as the restricted number of communities, the
multidimensional nature of public goods, limitations to mobility,
3. Boijas [1995] finds that there are "ethnic capital" effects even after
controlling for neighborhood effects. This may create incentives for segregation
along ethnic as well as class lines, although Boijas does not explore this particular
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and economies of scale in public goods provision [Rubinfeld 1987;
Atkinson and Stigiitz 19801. The social externalities raised by the
inequality literature, as discussed above, also complicate the
predictions of the Tiebout model. Finally, there are legal con-
straints to extreme segregation by ethnic group, even if these
constraints are only very partially eiFective.'' Thus, despite the
possibility of sorting, heterogeneous preferences within a commu-
nity will not disappear in practice. This is all we need for our
model.
In addition, the empirical local public finance literature has
one finding that may be relevant to our study. Many studies of
individual preferences find that blacks are more supportive of
spending on public education than whites.'"' This is interesting
because it suggests that any association of increased ethnic
diversity (which often means more blacks in the U. S. data) with
lower public education is not due to the fact that blacks them-
selves have a lower demand for public education.
Fourth, the sociological literature has also pointed to ethnic
divisions as a problem for public goods provision. Lieberman
[19931 writes that: "Ethnic groups must reach an accommodation
on various issues. As the accommodations become more distaste-
ful to one or more groups, the disaffected parties become more
supportive of alternatives to public education" [p. 171]. The
implication of this fact is a vicious circle, emphasized most vocally
by Wilson [1987,1996]. Poor minorities in highly segregated cities
need good public schools to improve their skills, but public schools
provision is low because of ethnic confiiet. The relative skill levels
of minorities in ghettos does not improve, and their poverty level
increases, making problems of central cities' unemployment and
decay even worse—and ethnic conflicts even more acute.
II. THEORY ^
We first present the basic model and then discuss several
extensions.
1
A. The Basic Model
Consider a political jurisdiction in which the population size
is normalized at 1, with no loss of generality. There is no mobility
4. Examples are fair housing laws, housing discrimination lawsuits, and
recent court battles over locating subsidized public housing (mainly occupied by
blacks) in wealthy white communities.
5. See Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts [1987] for references and a summary.1248 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
in or out of the jurisdiction.^ The members of the jurisdiction have
to decide, by majority rule, on a public good, both on its size and
type. Pubhc goods can be of different types, and different individu-
als have different preferences over them. The generic individual
I's utility function is given by
(1) u,^g''a-l,) + c
0<a< 1,
where g is the public good, which can be located anywhere on an
ideological line capturing different individuals' preferences; I,- is
the preference distance between individual i's most preferred type
of public good and the actual public good; c is private consumption.
Income is exogenous and equal for everybody.^ Private consump-
tion is equal to disposable income:
(2) c=y-t,
where y is the exogenous pretax income and t is the lump-sum tax
which, by assumption, is identical for everyone. This is natural,
since everybody has the same pretax income, and a standard
assumption in public finance is that taxes cannot be a function of
individual preferences.^ Note that since the population size is
normalized at 1, per capita and and aggregate variables are
identical, so, for instance, g represents the size ofthe public good
both in the aggregate and per capita terms. Then, the public
budget constraint implies that
(3) g = t.
Using (1), (2), and (3), we can rewrite individual preferences
as follows:
(4) Ui=g''a-li)+y-g.
This political jurisdiction has to decide, by majority rule, on the
size and type ofthe public good. We make the following assump-
tion on the voting process:
6. This is, of course, a restrictive assumption. One could generalize the model
to a situation where individuals could move hut with some costs. With moving
costs complete stratification would not occur in theory, nor is it ohserved in
practice. See Epple and Romer [1991] for the effect of mobility on voting on local
public goods.
7. In the working paper version of this paper, we present an extension in
which individual income is a function ofthe public good.
8. There is a connection here with the literature on revelation mechanisms
which we do not explore.PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1249
ASSUMPTION. Individuals vote first on the amount of taxation
(thus on the size of the publie good), and then on the type of
the publie good.
This assumption is made for tractability, in order to avoid
issues of multidimensional voting, whieh is not our focus. Also,
note that this order of voting resembles eommon budget proce-
dures in whieh the size of the budget is deeided before its
composition.^
We now solve the model backward, starting with the following
result, which derives from a straightforward application of the
median voter theorem, and is a slight generalization of a result by
Alesina and Spolaore [1997].
PROPOSITION 1. For any positive amount of publie goodg, the type
ehosen is the one most preferred by the median voter.
Let us now consider the choice of the size of the publie good^.
Individual i's preferred size is given by the result of the following
problem:
(5) max U, = g%l - l{) + y - g,
where /, is the distance of individual i from the ideal type of
median voter. This formulation incorporates the fact that the
voters know that, after a decision is reached on the size of ^, the
type chosen is the one most preferred by the median voter. The
solution of (5) (gf> is
(6) g*, = [ail - h)V'^'-''\
Define /["as the median distance from the type most preferred by
the median voter—in short the "median distance from the me-
dian." A straightforward appheation of the median voter theorem
implies the following result:
PROPOSITION 2. The amount of publie good provided in equilib-
rium is given by
(7) g* =
From Proposition 2 a Corollary follows:
9. For a recent discussion of budget procedures, see the survey of the
literature by Alesina and Perotti [1999].1250 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
COROLLARY. The equilibrium amount of public good is decreasing
in /J", the median distance from the median.
The median distance from the median can be considered an
indicator of polarization of preferences, as illustrated in Figure I.
Panel (a) shows a case of low median distance from the median;
panel (b) shows a case of a larger median distance from the
median. The picture of panel (b) is an example of a polarized
society, with two separate groups with relatively homogeneous
a)
Median DIslanca
from Uie Median
b)
Median Dtslance
• from tlie Median
FIGURE I
Examples of Different "Median Distances from the Median"PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1251
preferenees within the group, but very distinct preferences across
groups.
In summary, if /[" is high, a large fraction of the population
have preferences that are very far from the chosen type of public
good; therefore, they would prefer to keep taxes low and devote
more resources to private consumption rather than public con-
sumption. Ajurisdiction with two (or more) polarized groups (like
panel (b) of Figure I) is a prime example of high median distance
from the median.
B. Discussion I
We now discuss several issues not explicitly addressed in this
basic simple model, and how to bring the model to the data.
In our theoretical model, the preference polarization that
fuels interest group conflict is assumed, and is not related to
ethnicity or race. In the empirical work that follows in the next
sections, we use ethnic composition (which is easily observable) to
capture conflicts among groups. We need to justify this choice.
Much seholarly and general writing suggests that prefer-
ences about public policy and ethnie origins are strongly corre-
lated, and political eonfliets over public policies are more and more
often fought along ethnic dividing lines. Wilson 11996], Page
[19961, Bell [1992], Hacker 11995], Kozol [1991], and Huckfeldt
and Kohfeld [1989], among numerous others, argue that conflicts
over public policy in general and publie goods provisions in
particular, are more and more determined hy racial cleavages not
class cleavages. Their titles are sufficiently eloquent: Two Na-
tions: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, and Unequal [Haeker]
and Race and the Decline of Class in American Politics [Huckfeldt
and Kohfeld].»o
For illustrative examples of polarized preferences over publie
goods, first consider language instruction in public schools. With-
out commenting on what is desirable publie poliey, let us describe
the actual reaction of different ethnic groups to language instruc-
tion in, say, Oakland, California. Language is an issue for hlacks
10. Huckfeldt and Kohfeld [1989] present several case studies of city politics
with racial cleavages that are consistent with the spirit of our paper. An excellent
example is their discussion of St. Louis in the early to mid-eighties [pp. 18-22]. As
another polarization anecdote, they note that ali-white precincts in the 1985 St.
Louis mayoral election of a white against a black candidate voted for the white
candidate by a margin of 40 to 1. Many such examples exist: only 23 percent of
white (usually Democratic) New Yorkers voted for the black Democratic mayoral
incumbent David Dinkins; only 12 percent of (usually Democratic) Chicago whites
voted for the black Democratic mayoral candidate in 1983 [Hacker 1995, p. 231|.1252 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
in Oakland, as witness the recent furor over the proposal by the
Oakland School Board that black English be recognized as a
separate language ("Ebonics")- Although far from consensus on
the Ebonics extreme, many blacks feel that inner city black
children speaking nonstandard English have a right to programs
that meet their needs. Many Hispanic parents complain of
insufficient public resources for their children to get English as a
Second Language classes or bilingual education. Many Hispanics
reacted with hostility to the ill-fated Ebonics proposal as "a thinly
veiled effort to grab bilingual funds." Black parents responded
that bilingual education has diverted resources away from address-
ing the special needs of their children. Asian parents in turn
complain that Hispanic children get more bilingual resources
than do their children. For their part, many whites have objected
to the diversion of any resources to any nonstandard-Engiish
instniction.il If all ethnic groups are dissatisfied, this may be a
good indication of polarized groups who have wound up at an
unhappy position in the middle. The result, according to our
theoretical model, is that a jurisdiction spends less on public
education than it would have in the absence of such polarization. '^
Ethnic groups can have polarized preferences even over a
seemingly neutral public good like highways. When ethnic groups
are segregated within a city, these groups will have different
travel patterns within the city. Then these groups will have
different preferences for the location of major road arteries: each
group wants the road arteries to be convenient to their own travel
patterns. At the same time, no ethnic neighborhood itself wants to
he bisected or isolated by an expressway. Kozol [1991, p. 180]
argues that the Dan Ryan Expressway in Southside Chicago (built
several decades ago) had a destructive effect on the Wentworth
Avenue black neighborhood that was cut off" from the rest of the
city by the Expressway. Wilson [1996] also emphasizes how race
relations have a significant impact on the choice of the geographi-
cal distributions of roads and urban transportation systems.
Thus, if, say, a white person perceives that a public good is
11. The "thinly veiled" quote is from Los Angeles Times, January 19, 1997,
Part A, Page 1. This section is based largely on a series of articles by the LA Times
during the "Ebonics" controversy. Note that Oakland is thirteenth in the nation on
ETHNIC. There has not been complete white flight from the Oakland public
schools, as the population of Oakland is about one-third white, while the share of
private schools in enrollment is only 13 percent.
12. Goldin and Katz 11998] present evidence from the first part of this century
consistent with this implication.PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1253
enjoyed mostly by black citizens, he would oppose it precisely for
that reason. In other words, the identity ofthe beneficiaries ofthe
public good directly influences the utility level of each individual.
This mechanism would reinforce tbe argument put forward in our
model, namely that more ethnic fragmentation leads to fewer
resources pooled together to provide nonexcludable public goods.
Finally, it is clear that ethnicity is not the only determinant of
individual preferences over public goods. Certainly, income is
another one; therefore, the distribution of income, in addition to
ethnic fragmentation, could be an important determinant of the
distribution of preferences over public goods. This is why in the
empirical work we control for income distribution measures, in
our attempt to isolate the effects of ethnic fragmentation.^^
C. Patronage, Budget Shares, and Fiscal Discipline
Our simple model considered only one type of public expendi-
ture, a nonexcludable public good. In practice, public expenditure
can also be directed specifically to certain groups. For instance,
think of targeted transfers, or public employment used for patron-
age.^'* Interest group politics may lead to an increase in group-
targeted spending and patronage spending via "logrolling," and,
by the arguments discussed above, a reduction in the provision of
public goods.^^ This consideration is important for the empirical
analysis that follows, which focuses mostly on shares and to a
lesser extent on levels of public goods. Suppose that public
spending can be divided into two parts: one, labeled^], is mostly
patronage; the other, g-z, is a nonexcludable public good, wbich
only imperfectly can be targeted to specific groups. Total spending
is^ = ^i + g2. An increase in group polarization and interest group
politics would lead to a larger increase in^i, which is almost pure
patronage, relative to the increase in g2, which is almost purely
public. In fact ^2 may even decrease in level, if the public good
element in it predominates. In other words, polarization would
certainly lead to a decrease in the share of nonexcludable public
goods on total spending, that is, the share g^2A^i + ^2) is decreas-
ing in polarization. However, to the extent that even g2 can be
13. Meltzer and Richards [1981] are a "classic" reference on the efFect of
income distribution on the social choice ofthe size of redistributive programs.
14. See Aiesina, Baqir. and Easterly 11997] for a discussion of the efFect of
ethnic fragmentation on employment in U. S. cities.
15. A vast literature has discussed how interest group pressure leads to an
increase in spending specifically targeted to certain special interests. A classic
reference is Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 11981].1254 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
targeted to specific groups, the level of ^2 may actually increase
with interest group politics. Thus, we have stronger implications
for the effects of polarization on the share of spending on pure
public goods than on their level. Finally, the implications of
different levels of polarization on total government spending are
ambiguous, because of the opposite effect of pressure for more
group-specific spending programs, and fewer nonexcludable pub-
lic goods.
Our model is static, and has no implication for the budget
balance. However, a related literature suggests that sociopolitical
fragmentation may lead to conflicts over the allocation of the tax
burden that may lead to the postponement of deficit reduction
policies.'*' The empirical evidence supportive of this view is drawn
from OECD countries and U. S. states.^' In the empirical analysis
below we will check wbether ethnic fragmentation at the local
level has any implication for the fiscal balance of local governments.
The implications of the above theoretical discussion are as
follows: 1) the composition of public spending is a function of
ethnic fragmentation: the share of public goods spending is lower
in more ethnically fragmented localities; 2) the sign of the
correlation between the size of government spending and ethnic
fragmentation is not determined a priori, since transfers and
patronage spending may be positively related to ethnic fragmenta-
tion and public goods negatively related to tbe same variable; 3)
fiscal discipline is more problematic in ethnically fragmented
localities.
III. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
We test our hypotheses with three cross-section samples of
public goods spending in U. S. urban localities: cities, metropoli-
tan areas, and counties.
A Data and Sources
We use the ethnic fractionalization (ETHNIC) index as a
measure of ethnic fragmentation. ETHNIC measures the probabil-
ity that two randomly drawn people from a city, county, or
16. For theoretical models with this implication see Alesina and Drazen
11991] and Velasco [1994].
17. See Roubini and Sachs 11989], Alesina and Perotti [19951, and Kontopou-
los and Perotti [1997] on OECD countries and Poterha [19941 and Alt and Lowry
[1994! on U. S. states.PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1255
metropolitan area belong to different ethnic groups.^** Specifically,
we consider the population distribution hy race, and we construct
ETHNIC as follows:
(8) ETHNIC = 1 - E
where Raeei denotes the share of population self-identified as of
race i and
i = (White, Black,
Asian and Pacific Islander, American Indian, Other].
We follow the racial classification used hy the U. S. Census.
These classifications are somewhat arhitrary, hut they also refiect
which ethnic groupings are politically salient. Note that "His-
panic" is not a mutually exclusive category with these racial
classifications in the Census; Hispanic is reported separately as
the answer to a different question on "origin." However, there is a
high correlation (0.9) between "Hispanic" and "Other"in the ahove
classification. Many Hispanics apparently respond Other hecause
they do not feel accurately represented in the multiple racial
choice provided by the Census.'^ For practical purposes, then, the
category Other is essentially Hispanic.
We made an effort to collect data at different levels of
aggi*egation—cities, metropolitan areas, and counties—for three
reasons. First, there is going to be far more Tiebout sorting
between city and suburb of one metropolitan area than between
different metropolitan areas. Comparing the results at different
levels of aggregation will give us some idea of the possible biases
introduced by Tiehout sorting (although we also use instruments
for possibly endogenous right-hand-side variables). Second, none
of the data sets have an exact match between the unit of
ohservation and the relevant jurisdiction for voting on the public
good for all types of public goods. Different types of public goods
have different jurisdictions, and the jurisdictions themselves are
politically determined. Testing all of our results at different levels
18. This is the same measure used for linguistic groups in nations by Canning
and Fay [19931, Mauro 119951, Easterly and Levine [19961, and many others.
19. Data are available from some states on the matching between Hispanic
and Other In California in 1990, 49.5 percent of Hispanics chose one of the
existing racial categories and 50.5 percent chose Other. Ninety-two percent of
Hispanics who chose a racial category in California chose White [Hacker 1995, p. 6,
253], When Hispanics respond to the race question with White or Black rather
than Other, it may suggest they identify more with that ethnic category than with
being Hispanic—which is what is relevant for our purposes.1256 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of jurisdiction will give us some idea whether the results are
afTected by these problems. Third, and most prosaically, some
variables have data at one jurisdictional level but not at others.
Our county, metropolitan, and city data come from the County
and City Data Book, 1994 (CCD) published by the Bureau ofthe
Census.^" This publication provides data on a variety of subjects
for a cross section of U. S. counties, metropolitan areas, cities, and
places. "Cities" in the source are incorporated places that had a
1990 population of 25,000 or more. Expenditures are assigned to
the governmental level that executes them, regardless of whether
they are financed by transfers from higher levels of government.^^
Nearly all the data in this publication come from the Bureau ofthe
Census and other federal agencies. Most of our data refer to the
year 1990, unless otherwise stated, and use the city and county
data files. Especially for metropolitan and county data, we have
supplemented CCD with data from the publication City and
County Plus ICCF).^^
Our city sample, which includes places with 25,000 popula-
tion and above, is 1020 observations. As described in the Appen-
dix, we systematically checked each data set by sorting each
variable and examining extreme values. Our metro areas sample
consists of 304 observations. The county sample is 1386 observa-
tions. Because we are focusing on urban public goods, we have
excluded sparsely populated rural counties; we chose a county
population cutoff of 25,000 to match the CCD's cutoff for cities.^^
Less systematically, we looked at whether the data made
sense based on our (admittedly superficial) knowledge of U. S.
cities. We note, for example, that the top seven cities for share of
tbe population with a college degree are all college towns.^"^ The
20. Electronically we obtained the data from their CD-ROM version.
21. See the Data Appendix for more details. We obtained these definitions
from the statistical publications mentioned below and from a long, alheit nearly
incomprehensible, document called the Government Finance and Employment
Classification Manual [Census Bureau 1992].
22. Available from Slater Hall Information Products in hoth hard copy and
CD ROM. We obtain data from earlier years from City and County Compendium
(CCC), distributed on CD ROM hy Slater Hall Information Products.
23. Note that there are counties with as few as 52 inhabitants! We omitted a
small number of observations in each sample that a priori made no sense—such as
zero city government spending in a couple of cities—as described in the Data
Appendix. In any case, our results are robust to simply using the full available
sample without removing any data anomalies (although we think it is better to
remove observations that do not make sense). Results obtained using all the
observations are available and are virtually identical to those presented in the
text.
24. In decreasing rank, East Lansing, MI, Chapel Hill, NC, Weat Lafayette,
IN, State College, PA, Palo Alto, CA, Ann Arbor, MI, and Davis, CA.PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1257
two cities with the highest ineome inequality are Beverly Hills,
CA, and Miami Beach, FL. Beverly Hills is also the richest city
with an income that is ten times that ofthe poorest—Pharr, TX.
The top recipient of intergovernmental transfers is Washington,
DC, and this city also has the largest deficit before transfers (New
York City is close behind Washington, DC, in these categories).
Table I reports the names and definitions of all the variables
used in this paper. Table II reports summary statistics for the city
sampie. Analogous tables for the other samples are reported in the
Appendix. In tbe city sample, our measure of ethnic fragmenta-
tion, ETHNIC, ranges from .014 (for Gloucester, MA) to .73 (for
Carson, CA).^^ For the sample of metropolitan areas, ETHNIC
ranges from .024 (Dubuque. IA) to .61 (Los Angeles-Long Beach,
CA) with a median of .247. For the County sample ETHNIC
ranges from .007 (Wayne County, WV) to .677 (Bronx County, NY).
B. Results '
We discuss the controls we will use, present results of
different local fiscal variables regressed on ETHNIC and controls,
and then discuss some sensitivity checks.
We are interested in the effect of ethnic fractionalization
(ETHNIC) on various fiscal variables. For each regression, in
addition to ETHNIC, we include control variables. Our first
control variable is income per capita, since more developed, richer
cities may have more public goods. Our second control is city size,
for which we use the log of 1990 population. The relationship
between public goods and ethnic fragmentation may be driven by
city size—with big cities being more fragmented and having
"ghettos." Also there are important scale factors in pubhc goods.
Educational attainment might be another possible omitted vari-
able from our model, with more educated cities choosing better
city policies, demanding more education for their children, or
monitoring tbe provision of their public goods. For educational
attainment we use BAGRAD, which is the fraction of population
aged 25 or over who have completed college or a higher degree.
The next control is income inequality. One may argue tbat
polarization of preferences is a function of polarization of income
levels, rather than race. Therefore, income inequality, not ethnic
fragmentation, might explain the pattern of provision of public
25. Since we have five ethnic groups, the maximum that ETHNIC could
theoretically reach in our framework is .8, which would occur if each ofthe five
ethnic groups accounted for 20 percent ofthe population.1258 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE I
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
OBSERVATIONS ARE FOR 1990 UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED
Ethnic fractional-
ization
Ethnic fractionaliz.
1980
Black
American Indian
Asian
Other race
White
Ethnicity
Measures the probability that two persons drawn randomly
from the population belong to different self-identified
ethnic groups (white, black, American Indian. Asian, and
other), hence ranges from 0 (complete homogeneity) to 1
(complete heterogeneity)
Ethnic Fractionalization Index in 1980
Black, fraction of total population
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut (fraction of total popula-
tion)
Asian or Pacific Islander, Tbtal (fraction of total population)
Not Black, American Indian, Asian, or White (fraction of
total population); proxy for Hispanic
White, fraction of total population
Government
Intergovt revenue
per capita
Taxes per capita
Surplus per capita
Surplus per capita
before transfers
Debt per capita
Expenditure per
capita
Share of spending
on health
Share ofspending
on education
Share of spending
on police
Share ofspending
on fire protection
Share of spending
on roads
Share of spending
on welfare
Share of spending
on sewerage and
trash pickup
Spending on roads
per capita
Revenue from transfers from higher levels of government,
per capita, 1990-1991
Tbtal local government taxes per capita, 1990-1991
Per capita local government surplus
Per capita local government surplus excluding intergovern-
mental transfers from revenue
Per capita local government debt outstanding
General local government expenditure per capita, 1990-
1991
Fraction of general local government expenditure for health
and hospitals
Fraction of general local government expenditure for educa-
tion (metro and county only)
Percent of general local government expenditure for police
protection
Fraction of genera! local government expenditure for fire
protection (available for cities only)
Fraction of general local government expenditure for high-
ways
Fraction of local government direct general expenditures for
public welfare (metro and county only)
Fraction of general local government expenditure for sew-
erage and trash pickup (available for cities only)
Per capita expenditure on highwaysPUBUC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1259
TABLE I
(CONTINUED)
Income, education, and population
Numher of house-
holds
Fraction of popula-
tion >65
Log of population
Median household
income
Income per capita
Income per capita,
1979
Percentage BA
graduates
Mean to median
income ratio
Numher of households
Fraction of population that is 65 years or older
Log of population '
Median household money income, 1989
Per capita money income, 1989
Per capita money income, 1979
Persons 25 years and over, fraction with Bachelor's degree
or higher
Ratio of mean to median household income, constructed
from above variables
goods. Our measure of income inequality is the ratio of the mean
household income to the median household income in a jurisdic-
tion.^^ We will later add the poverty rate as a rohustness check.
We also control for the age structure, measured as the
percentage of population that is 65 or older. The empirical local
public good literature, briefly reviewed above, has emphasized the
role of age structure as a determinant of preferences for public
goods, most obviously for education.
Table III illustrates our approach with the example of a
regression for the city's share of spending on roads. The share of
city spending on roads decreases with higher ethnic diversity: in
all the regressions the coefficient on ETHNIC is highly significant
with ^statistics ranging from -4.7 to -8.7. The magnitude of the
coefficient has a nice shorthand interpretation in this and in all
the other regressions: it is the amount by which the dependent
variable (in this case fraction of city spending on roads) would
change going from complete ethnic homogeneity (ETHNIC = 0) to
complete heterogeneity (ETHNIC = ll.^"? Hence, a move from
complete homogeneity to heterogeneity would lower the roads
26. Note that this is the theoretically appropriate measure of income inequal-
ity in any model based upon the median voter theorem applied to fiscal decisions.
27. Remember, however, that complete heterogeneity is not possible in our
data because we have only five ethnic groups—constraining ETHNIC to a
maximum of .8—we mention this interpretation only because of its heuristic ease.1260 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
SUMMARY
Variable name
American Indian
Asian
Percentage BA graduates
Black
Ethnic fractionalization
Expenditure per capita
Share of spending on
police
Share of spending on fire
protection
Share of spending on
roads
Share of spending on sew-
erage and trash pickup
Spending on roads per
capita
Mean to median income
ratio
Income per capita
Other race
Fraction of population
>65
Log of population
Intergovt revenue per
capita
Surplus (after transfers)
per capita
Surplus (before transfers)
per capita
Taxes per capita
White
Mean
0.01
0.04
0.23
0.12
0.29
876
0.16
0.09
0.11
0.13
81
1.26
14,861
0.05
0.12
10.97
209
-21
-230
373
0.79
TABLE
STATISTICS
Median
0.00
0.02
0.20
0.04
0.28
710
0.15
009
0.10
0.12
68
1.24
13,682
0.01
0.12
10.76
123
-6
-149
296
0.84
II
ON CITY DATA
Min.
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.01
161
0.00
O.(X)
0.01
0.00
2
1.03
5,561
0.00
0.02
10.13
1
-1866
-2321
38
0.02
Max.
0.14
0.84
0.71
0.98
0.73
7154
0.48
0.25
0.43
0.67
371
2.25
55,463
0.67
0.49
15.81
2456
677
411
3978
0.99
Std.
dev.
0.01
0.08
0.12
0.16
0.17
561
0.07
0.05
0.07
0.09
51
0.14
5,002
0.08
0.05
0.77
245
142
286
276
0.18
No. of
obs.
1076
1076
1076
1076
1076
1020
1020
1020
1020
1020
1020
1076
1076
1076
1076
1076
1020
1020
1020
1020
1076
Unit
Fraction
Fraction
Fraction
Fraction
Fraction
$per
capita
Fraction
Fraction
Fraction
Fraction
$per
capita
Ratio
$per
capita
Fraction
Fraction
Log of #
people
$per
capita
$per
capita
$per
capita
$per
capita
Fraction
Spending share by around .09 (nine percentage points). In terms of
our sample variation, a one-standard-deviation change in ETHNIC
would change the share of spending on roads by one-quarter of a
standard deviation.
ETHNIC remains significant after including control vari-
ables. The share of spending on roads is inversely related toPUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1261
I
TABLE III
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS EXPENDITURE SHARE ON ROADS, CITY SAMPLE
RHS var.
Constant
Ethnic fractionalization
Income per capita
Log of population
Percentage B A graduates
Mean to median income
ratio
Fraction of population
>65
No. of obs.
AdjR^
1
0.14
(31.44)
-0.098
(-8.69)
1020
0.07
2
0.12
(14.07)
-0.090
(-7.68)
l.llE-06
(2.52)
1020
0.07
3
0.18
(7.35)
-0.080
(-6.39)
1.14E-06
(2.56)
-0.006
(-2.66)
1020
0.07
4
0.18
(7.40)
-0.079
(-6.34)
7.00E-07
(1.30)
-0.006
(-2.72)
0.028
(1.25)
1020
0.07
5
0.29
(9.33)
-0.060
(-4.72)
- 1.47E-O7
(-0.26)
-0.006
(-2.62)
0.085
(3.42)
-0.096
(-6.03)
1020
0.11
6
0.28
(9.22)
-0.083
(-6.38)
9.34E-07
(1.70)
-0.006
(-2.86)
0.007
(0.26)
-0.047
(-2.86)
-0.253
(-6.25)
1020
0.13
Heteroak«daeticity-corrected f-statkstics are in parentheaeB.
population size, to income inequality, and to age structure. We
now present all our results organized by groups of related
variables.
Table IV (like Table V which will follow) is organized in this
way: the first column identifies the dependent variable. The
following two columns report the coefficients and the ^statistics of
the variable ETHNIC in two different regressions that are identi-
cal to regression 1 (no controls) and regression 6 (all controls)
reported in full in Table III.^^ We report in Table FV our results for
all three samples: cities, metropohtan areas, and counties. The
control variables are the same in all three samples. The only
difference is that for metropolitan areas and counties we present
results using two-stage-least squares. We instrument for both
ETHNIC and income per capita, using the values of ETHNIC and
income per capita in 1979-1980. Results using OLS are similar
and are available upon request. We did not have the earlier data
to use as instruments for the city sample. When a dependent
variable does not appear in all three samples, it is because of data
28. For the sake of completeness we also report in this table the regressions
on the expenditure share on roads, which are, of course, identical to those of Table
in. We have also checked that the results on ETHNIC are robust to adding one
control variable at a time, like in Table III. Our results are indeed robust.1262 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE IV
COEFFICIENTS ON ETHNIC IN TWO REGRESSIONS POH EXPENDITURE SHARES
Regressions
Dependent variable:
1 (no 6 (all
controls) controls) #obs
City
Share of spending on roads
Share of spending on sewerage and trash
pickup
Share of spending on police
Share of spending on fire protection
Spending on roads per capita
Metro
Share of spending on roads
Share of spending on police
Share of spending on education
Share of spending on health
Share of spending on welfare
Spending on roads per capita
County
Share of spending on roads
Share of spending on police
Share of spending on education
Share of spending on health
Share of spending on welfare
Spending on roads per capita
-0.098
(-8.69)
-0.047
(-2.97)
0.057
(4.58)
-0.002
(-0.18)
-36.4
(-4.30)
-0.076
(-9.14)
0.024
(4.26)
-0.145
(-4.21)
0.219
(5.46)
-0.030
(-1.73)
-137
(-7.19)
-0.076
(-15.72)
0.031
(10.96)
-0.109
(-5.27)
0.138
(6.78)
-0.043
(-6.41)
-139
(-13.29)
-0.083
(-6.38)
-0.079
(-4.34)
0.099
(7.37)
-0.004
(-0.40)
-37.0
(-3.59)
-0.058
(-4.84)
0.020
(2.39)
-0.174
(-3.62)
0.269
(4.03)
-0.047
(-2.62)
-111
(-4.44)
-0.055
(-9.26)
0.038
(10.44)
-0.103
(-4.18)
0.125
(5.02)
-0.051
(-7.03)
-96
(-7.20)
1020
1020
1020
1020
1020
304
304
304
304
304
304
1386
1386
1386
1386
1386
1386
0.13
0.09
0.10
0.05
0.08
0.22
0.18
0.17
0.10
0.01
0.15
0.21
0.20
0.13
0.07
0.05
0.11
RegreHsiona I and 6 include the set of control variables that are In regreRsions 1 and 6 in T^ble III.
Heteroakedaflticity-corrected i-statistics are in parentheses.PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1263
availability. The pattern of results on the other control variables is
reasonable.^^
The results on ETHNIC are quite striking. ETHNIC is
negatively associated with the share in the budget of three
"productive" public goods: education, roads, and sewerage and
trash pickup. We consider this result to be the main empirical
result of the paper, since these are the variables for which the
theory made an unambiguous prediction, as discussed in subsec-
tion II.C.
The roads result for cities was already featured in Table III.
We now see that this result on roads is robust across all three
samples. We also estimate the effect of ETHNIC on the level of
roads spending per capita rather than as a share of the budget;
although theoretically ambiguous, this efifect is negative and
significant in all three samples. The other levels results also
usually have the same sign and significance as the corresponding
share variable.'"'
The share of spending for welfare is also negatively associ-
ated with ETHNIC in both the metro and county samples (the
only samples for which it is available), even though in the metro
area sample the bivariate association is only marginally signifi-
cant at conventional levels. A one-standard-deviation increase in
ETHNIC is associated with a fifth of a standard deviation
decrease in the share of welfare spending. We speculate that
29. Tb anticipate the most robust efFects of the other control variables across
all our regressions: income has a positive effect on the share of spending on police,
road spending per capita, local education revenue collected per student, and taxes
and spending per capita. Local income has a negative effect on federal and state
education revenue per pupil. Population size has a positive effect on education
spending per pupil, taxes per capita, federal, state, and local revenue per pupil,
and a negative effect on share of health spending. The fraction with a college
degree has a negative effect on intergovernmental transfers, and a positive effect
on education revenue collected per student. Inequality has a negative effect on
education spending per pupil. The percent of the population 65-and-up has a
positive effect on education spending per pupil (oddly enough) but a negative effect
on the share o/" spending going to education. Complete results are available upon
request.
30, In the county sample with the full set of controls, health spending per
capita and police spending per capita are significantly and positively related to
ETHNIC, while education spending per pupil and welfare spending per capita
were significantly and negatively related to ETHNIC. In other words, all the level
variables have the same signs and significance as the share variables in the county
sample. In the metro sample also, all the level variables have the same sign as the
share variables, and all are significant except for welfare spending per capita. In
the city sample, ETHNIC is negative but insignificant for sewerage spending per
capita, and significantly positive for fire protection spending per capita and police
spending per capita.1264 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ethnic groups dislike redistributive programs that favor other
groups.^^
The share of expenditure on police increases with ETHNIC,
in all three samples. PoHce spending obviously has something to
do with crime, and indeed the size and significance of this
coefficient would be reduced if we controlled for crime. The
correlation across cities between ETHNIC and violent crimes per
capita is .48. We regard crime as endogenous to public goods
quantity, income, income distribution, and ethnic diversity, and so
is one of the channels through which these other variables
influence public choices. In any event, in the sensitivity discussion
below we will control for crime.
Spending on health and hospitals increases with ETHNIC in
tbe metro and county samples (this item does not usually show up
in city budgets and so is not in the city sample). We are not sure
wby this item, which includes a mixture of public goods provision
and transfers in the form of subsidized health services, is posi-
tively related to ETHNIC.
Of course, if most, but not all (remember police), shares are
going down with ETHNIC, some otber shares must be going up.
The categories of spending that Table IV includes account for, on
average, 73 percent ofthe budget in the county sample, 67 percent
ofthe budget in metro areas, and 51 percent ofthe budget in cities.
The residual includes interest payments on debt and various
poorly classified and described discretionary programs. This
"other" unidentified spending could include "patronage," although
we have no direct evidence that this is so. However, the looseness
in the definition of these other programs may indicate room for
patronage spending. We find in the city and county results—
although not in the metro sample—that this residual share is
positively, significantly, and robustly related to ETHNIC.
Table V reports results on aggregate fiscal variables: intergov-
ernmental transfers, deficits and debt, total spending, and total
revenues. ETHNIC is positively associated with more intergovern-
mental transfers in the city, metro, and county samples (although
only the bivariate association is significant in the city and metro
samples). Namely, more ethnically fragmented localities receive
more transfers per capita from higher levels of government, even
31. Page [1996, p. 247] cites a 1986 poll in which 17 percent of whites
supported increased spending on programs that primarily assisted blacks, com-
pared with 74 percent of blacks. See also Luttmer 11997] for recent evidence on this
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TABLE V
CoEFPrciENTs ON ETHNIC IN SK REGRESSIONS FOR FISCAL AGGREGATES
Regressions
Dependent variable: 1 (no controls) 6 (all controls)
Government balances
City
Intergovt revenue per capita ,
1
Surplus (after transfers) per capita
Surplus (before transfers) per capita
Metro
I ntergovt revenue per capita i
Surplus {after transfers) per capita
Surplus (before transfers) per capita
Debt per capita
County
Intergovt revenue per capita
Surplus (after transfers) per capita
Surplus (before transfers) per capita
Debt per capita
174.7
(3.46)
-39.8
(-1.69)
-214.5
(-3.81)
269
(2.U)
96
(1.79)
-173
(-1.35)
1438
(2.95)
293
(5.64)
44
(1.15)
-115
(-2.65)
837
(1.88)
Thxes, spending
City
Taxes per capita
Expenditure per capita
1
Metro 1
Taxes per capita
Expenditure per capita
County
Taxes per capita
1
Expenditure per capita '
184.1
(3.25)
606.0
(4.44)
-140
(-1.27)
497
(2.11)
-172
(-2.80)
365
(3.16)
1
1
64,1
(1.39)
-78.3
(-2.77)
-142.3
(-2.55)
24
(0.15)
6
(0.07)
-18
(-0.12)
1117
(1.83)
166
(2.60)
23
(0.48)
-50
(-0.80)
1079
(2.24)
150.0
(2.73)
317.9
(2.96)
-173
(-1.61)
420
(1.33)
-47
(-0.97)
400
(3.35)
#obs
1020
1020
1020
304
304
304
303
1385
1385
1396
1386
1020
1020
304
304
1386
1386
Adj. R'^
0.07
0.01
0.05
0.08
0.02
0.06
0.17
0.05
0.003
0.01
0.01
0.17
0.12
0.53
0.21
0.45
0.15
ionB I through 6 includp the set of control variabteB that are in rep^asions 1 through 6 in Table III.
Heteroskedasticity-corrected (-etatiistiCH are in parentheses.1266 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
after controlling for the level of income and its distribution. Why
this is the case is an interesting politico-economic question. One
interpretation could be that the higher levels of governments try
to compensate ethnically fragmented communities precisely
because of the difficulties that the latter have in directing
local resources to the supply of public goods. A more C3mical
explanation is that more ethnically fragmented localities have
more pressure groups that can lobby for support from higher
levels of government.•^^
There is some evidence that the fiscal balance before intergov-
ernmental transfers tends to be worse in more ethnically frag-
mented localities, although this result is not robust across samples.
The only robust result on this point comes from tbe city sample.
Remember that the theory was ambiguous on this point. More
ethnically fragmented cities have a larger deficit (or smaller
surplus) even after intergovernmental transfers, even though the
latter are positively associated with fragmentation. Although the
deficit result was not robust in metropolitan areas and counties,
those samples feature a related robust result that accumulated
local debt is positively associated with ETHNIC.
Total spending is significantly and positively associated with
ETHNIC in all three samples. For example, in the city sample, a
one-standard-deviation increase in ETHNIC is associated with
one-seventh of a standard deviation increase in spending per
capita. A move from zero to complete heterogeneity would imply
an increase in spending per capita of 400-500 dollars. This would
support the logrolling extension of the theory we discussed in the
theoretical subsection II.C.
The results on local tax revenues are not consistent. Taxes are
positively associated with ETHNIC in cities (although the magni-
tude of the tax increase with ETHNIC is less than half of the
spending increase with ETHNIC). Taxes are negatively associated
with ETHNIC in metro areas and counties (although the negative
association is only significant in the bivariate relationship).
The strong results on fiscal aggregates are on deficits or debt,
and total spending. These results suggest the following summary
pattern. Total spending tends to go up with higher ETHNIC. Yet
32. Note that in tbis regression we are controlling for income per capita, so
the fact that an ethnically fragmented locality may be poorer cannot be a full
explanation of tbis finding. The correlation between ETHNIC and per capita
income is -.24 in the city sample, .016 in the metro sample, and -.077 in the
county sample,PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1267
local taxes go up much less with ETHNIC, or may even go down.
So the higher local spending with higher ETHNIC is financed by a
combination of higher debt and deficits, and more intergovernmen-
tal transfers.
rv. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The consistency of the pattern of our results across different
levels of aggregation lends us some reassurance that the results
are not badly contaminated by endogenous migration, even if our
use of instrumental variables did not fully resolve such endogene-
ity. A remaining concern about our results is that they could refiect
some unobserved third factor that affects both public goods and
ethnic divisions. We addressed this in two ways. First, we
managed to obtain data for 1960 for some of our variables in order
to do panel estimation controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
These results have a number of problems that we describe below.
Second, we tried plausible omitted variables in the cross-section
estimation, such as percent black, crime, population density,
Democratic share of vote for President, and state dummies.
A. Unobserved Heterogeneity with Panel Data
We concentrated on obtaining data for 1960, since we wanted
a long enough time period that could allow some intertemporal
variation in the variables. In fact, the time variation in ETHNIC
is very small. Even between 1960 and 1990 the absolute median
change in this variable was 0.04. Hence, we did not even try to
obtain data for 1970 and 1980.
We faced several problems in using the 1960 city and county
data (metro data were unavailable for 1960). First, jurisdictions
change boundaries over time, and so we need to check that the
unit of analysis (city, county, etc.) remains relatively unchanged
from 1960 to 1990. We investigated this issue using data on land
area of cities and counties. We found that county land areas
remain largely constant, while city land areas have risen substan-
tially from 1960 to 1990, and at an uneven rate across cities. A
regression of 1990 area on 1960 area yielded an R"^ of .99 for
counties and only .32 for cities. For this reason, we decided to use
only the county data in our panel exercise.
Second, we faced the problem that the 1960 data only
identified three ethnic groups: white, black, and other. We redid
our 1990 ETHNIC calculation using the same three-way classifica-1268 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
tion and used this for our panel exercise. We also were forced to
use attainment of high-school degree rather than of a BA degree
because the latter was unavailable in the 1960 sample.
For all of these reasons, the results with panel data should be
taken only as suggestive at best.
Table VI shows the panel results for our core variables: the
share of education spending, the share of roads spending, and
road spending per capita. Although ETHNIC loses significance
under fixed efifects with a full set of controls, the share variables
display a significant and negative bivariate association with
ETHNIC using fixed effects. We note, by the way, that the same
occurs to most of the other controls, namely in the regressions
with a full set of controls most of them are insignificant. ETHNIC
remains significant with several combinations of controls, but
loses it when income per capita and high school graduates are
TABLE VI
RESULTS FROM CoimrY DATA SET FOR COEFFICIENT ON ETHNIC
IN POOLED SAMPLE 1960. 1990
coefficient on ethnic
^-statistic
coefficient on ethnic
t-statistic
coefficient on ethnic
i-statistic
Education share of spending
Fixed effects
No control All controls
-0.115 0.002
-4.20 0.09
Random effects
No control All controls
-0.079 -0.036
-5.45 -2.46
Roads share of spending
Fixed effects
No control All controls
-0.193 -0.008
-10.88 -0.64
Random effects
No control All controls
-0.101 0.083
-15.46 -12.95
Roads spending per capita (1990 dollars)
Fixed effects
No control All controls
28.9 -5.3
2.27 -0.39
Random effects
No control All controls
-77.2 -79.1
-9.60 -9.56
Random effects results put in italics indicates that the Hausmaii t«st rejected orthogooalily of the random
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introduced. For the road share variable the bivariate coefficient on
ETHNIC under fixed effects is more than twice as large as the
bivariate coefficient in the county cross section in Table IV. The
coefficient on ETHNIC in the bivariate fixed effects regression for
education share is about the same as in the corresponding
regression in Table IV. The result on roads spending per capita is
positive and significant in the bivariate association under fixed
effects, and insignificant with the full set of controls. Using
random effects, all three variables are negatively and significantly
related to ETHNIC both with and without the full set of controls.
Which set of results should we take more seriously? On the
one hand, the fixed effects estimator has the virtue that it does not
require the country effects to be orthogonal to the right-hand-side
variables. A Hausman test indeed rejects orthogonality for five of
the six random effects regressions in Table VI. On the other hand,
the fixed effects estimator is very costly in degrees of freedom in a
sample with a large cross section but only two time periods. We do
not think that the strong cross-section results should be disre-
garded because of the insignificance of ETHNIC in the fixed
effects regression with all controls. Given the data problems
discussed above, we take some comfort from the surprisingly
supportive results from the bivariate fixed effects regression.
B. Cross-Seetional Results
We think a more promising approach is to directly test the
effect on the ETHNIC coefficient of including plausible variables
that were omitted in the regressions for Table IV. The results of
our sensitivity analysis for our core dependent variables—shares
of spending on roads, public education and trash pickup—are
presented in Table VII. The entries in the table report coefficients
on the ETHNIC variable in different specifications we tried (each
coefficient corresponds to one regression). The first row reports
the baseline coefficients on ETHNIC from the regressions in Table
IV. Each of the subsequent rows reports the results on the
ETHNIC variable when we control for additional variahles or split
the sample in different ways. We organize our discussion below by
the type of robustness checks we undertake.
The first issue we look at is the individual components of the
ETHNIC variable. The largest minority in American localities is,
of course, blacks. Not surprisingly the share of blacks (BLACK) is1270 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE VII
CHECKING ROBUSTNESS OF COEFFICIENTS ON ETHNIC
TO POSSIBLE OMITTED VARIABLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Specification
Baseline
%BLACK and
%BLACK-
squared
Tbp quintile by
population
All but top quin-
tile
Population den-
sity
Violent crime
per capita
Democratic
share of vote for
President
State dmmnies
City sample
Road 1
share
-0082
-6.528
-0.080
-5.273
-0.121
-4.048
-0.077
-5.549
-0.074
-5.847
-0.079
-5.200
N/A
-0.064
-4.382
Sewerage
share
-0.078
-4.395
-0.135
-5.966
-0.119
-2.964
-0.071
-3.636
-0.070
-3.888
-0.081
-3.912
N/A
-0.080
-3.453
Metro sample
Road ]
share
-0.058
-4.835
-0.070
-4.984
-0.033
-1.861
-0.059
-4.456
-0.056
-4.634
-0.064
-4.198
-0.061
-4.827
-0.044
-3.429
Education
share
-0.174
-3.617
-0.194
-3.111
-0.218
-1.700
-0.174
-3.347
-0,171
-3.565
-0.130
-2.043
-0.167
-3.287
-0.087
-1.638
County sample
Road
share
-0.055
-9.264
-0.031
-3.836
-0.025
-2.489
-0.063
-9.328
-0.055
-9.292
-0.050
-6.672
-0.054
-8.616
-0.028
-4.439
Education
share
-0.103
-4.179
-0.051
-1.259
(p-value = 0.20)
-0.278
-5.853
-0.074
-2.670
-0.102
-4.117
-0.049
-1.706
-0.097
-3.775
-0.118
-4.161
Heteroakedaaticily-consistent (-statistica are reported below coefficient eBtimflt«8.
correlated quite strongly with ETHNIC.^^ Therefore, one may
wonder whether ETHNIC is practically equivalent to BLACK,
which may imply different interpretations of our results pre-
sented thus far. The difference between the two variables lies in:
(1) ETHNIC captures divisions between five ethnic groups while
BLACK captures only black versus nonblack; (2) ETHNIC treats
as equivalent two observations (a) 70 percent whites and 30
percent blacks and (b) 30 percent whites and 70 percent blacks,
whereas BLACK implies the two are very difFerent. If, for
whatever reason, BLACK was the "true" variable affecting local
fiscal behavior, then the coefficients on ETHNIC should go to zero
when BLACK is included in the regressions. The second row of
Table VII in which we control for BLACK and BLACK-squared
shows that this is not the case. Results for the road-share
33. The correlation coefficient for the city, metro, and county samples are 0.58,
0.72, and 0.80, respectively.PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1271
dependent variable are about the same as in the baseline case and
statistically significant at conventional levels for all three samples.
The magnitude of the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity
and share of spending on roads becomes slightly stronger in the
metro sample and slightly weaker in the county sample (com-
pared with baseline coeffieients).^^ Results for education share do
not change significantly in the metro sample, but become weaker
in the county sample: the magnitude of the point estimate drops to
about half of its value in the baseline case, and the associated
standard error increases from 0.025 to 0.041 (p-value = 0.20).
However, neither BLACK nor BLACK-squared is significant in
any of the education share regressions. Because of the fairly high
correlation between ETHNIC and BLACK in the county sample
(0.80), the reduction in the ^statistic on the ETHNIC variable is
likely due to multieollinearity.^^' On the other hand, the results for
sewerage spending become stronger with the additional controls
of BLACK and BLACK-squared.^« Overall, we do not find a
systematic effect of BLACK for our results, and the continued
strong results on ETHNIC indicate that it is not just proxying for
BLACK in its efFect on public goods provision.
Another closely related question; do our results on ETHNIC
come about because government fiscal outcomes are difFerent
depending on whether whites or blacks are in charge (i.e., whether
the median voter is black or white)? The travails of black majority
cities such as Washington, DC, are well-known. Moreover, it is
true that black majority cities have much higher ETHNIC (.46)
than do white majority eities (.27), because white majorities are
usually larger than black majorities. So ETHNIC could just be
proxying for blaek majorities versus white majorities.
This turns out not to be true. We test the idea by restricting
the sample to localities with a white majority. If the effect of
ETHNIC on our fiscal policy variable was due to the difference
34. Estimated coefficients on BLACK and BLACK-squared are not significant
in the city or metro samples. For the county sample the estimated coefficients (with
(-statistics in parentheses) on BLACK and BLACK-squared. respectively, are as
follows: -0.093 (-4.51) and 0.162 (4.021). The implied turning point in the
quadratic is BLACK = 0.29.
35. The reduction in the magnitude of the coefficient indicates that majorities'
reaction to increasing minority share (by reducing expenditure on public educa-
tion) is somewhat weaker when the minority that is increasing in population share
is nonhlack. There is, however, only weak evidence for this since this is not true in
the metro sample and is also not true for other types of productive good spending.
36. The e.stimated coefficients (with ^statistics in parentheses) on BLACK
and BLACK-squared. respectively, are as follows: 0.237 (3.67) and -0.314 (-3.24).
The implied turning point in the quadratic is BLACK ^ 0.36.1272 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
between black-majority and white-majority cities, then the coeffi-
cients on ETHNIC should go toward zero in the solely white-
majority sample. In fact, when we rerun all our regressions on the
sample of localities with a white majority, our results are almost
entirely unchanged. This result is unsurprising sinee the vast
majority of the sample consists of white-majority localities (92
percent in cities, 100 percent in metro areas, and 98 percent in
counties). Thus, our results are consistent with the idea that
white majorities vote to reduce the supply of productive public
goods as the share of blacks and other minorities increases.^'^
The next issue we look at for checking the sensitivity of our
results is the effect of population size and concentration. Although
we controlled for log of the eity population in the base regressions,
we now split the sample by population size to check for potential
nonhnear efFects. Since the public goods problems of big urban
areas are well-known, we address the concern that the nature of
the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and public goods
may be different in big versus small cities. In particular, we see
whether the results are being driven by the worst outcomes in big
cities versus the rest of the sample. The third row of Table VII
shows the results on ETHNIC when we restrict the sample to the
top quintile of observations by population. The next row shows the
results for the complement sample to the above. All regressions
have log of the eity population as one of the controls. If our results
presented earlier were simply masking the difference between big
and small urban areas, the findings on ETHNIC would disappear
when we look at them separately. The reported coefGcients in the
second and third rows of Table VII show that this is not the case.
ETHNIC is significant at 5 percent in all specifications except for
the top-quintile metro regressions in which it is significant at 10
percent. The top-quintile metro sample has only 61 observations.
Looking at changes in the magnitude of the coefficients on
ETHNIC, the biggest changes are for the top-quintile regressions—
big cities, coimties, and metro areas seem slightly different.
However, it is difficult to see a systematic pattern in this "differ-
37. A serious statistical analysis of localities with a black majority is almost
impossible. The samples are too small. In the city or county sample, there are
between 21 and 40 observations (14-33 degrees of freedom). There are no black
majority metropolitan areas. In the black majority cities, ETHNIC will increase as
the share of blacks decreases and as the share of whites increases (a check of the
sample shows that the variation in ETHNIC in the black majority cities is driven
mainly by black versus white). In the black majority city sample with 36
observations, just for the record, the only statistically significant result is that the
share of police spending still goes up with ETHNIC.PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1273
ence" except for the education-share regressions. The impact of
ethnic heterogeneity on education spending is considerably greater
in big urban areas for both the metro and county samples. For
roads the effect is bigger in magnitude in big cities but smaller in
big metro areas and counties. We conclude that the relationship
between ethnic heterogeneity and public goods spending is robust
to both big and small cities and that for education the problem
may be exacerbated in big urban areas. Related to the issue of big
urban areas, we look at population density as a possible omitted
variable driving the results. Row 5 in Table VII presents the
results. Controlling for population density leaves the coefficients
on ETHNIC virtually unchanged from their baseline values.
Another possible omission from our right-hand-side variables
is the crime rate in cities. Cities with higher crime rates may be
associated with greater ethnic heterogeneity and smaller spend-
ing shares on roads, education, and sewerage (because of greater
spending on police for instance). Indeed, in our sample crime is
positively correlated with ethnic heterogeneity and negatively
with spending shares on education, roads, and sewage. In row 5
we add violent crime per capita as one of the control variables.^^
Results on ETHNIC do not change significantly except for educa-
tion-share in the county sample in which the coefficient reduces to
about half of its value in the baseline case (the standard error does
not change much: 0.025 versus 0.028). Although the coefficient is
significant at the 10 pereent level of confidence, the reduction
indicates that part of the effect may be going through the
variation in crime rates.
We next consider the Democratic share of the vote for
President as a possible omitted variable. Cities with greater
shares of minorities may be Democrat eities or counties, which
may afFect their fiscal decisions. The sixth row in Table VII shows
that controlling for this for the metro and county samples does not
alter our findings on ETHNIC.^s
Our final concern is heterogeneity across states. States could
vary in their institutional arrangements for provision of public
services. The last row in Table VII shows the results on ETHNIC
with a complete set of state dummy variables. There is a slight
reduction in the coefficients for road-share regressions, with the
most pronounced effect in the county sample. ETHNIC is signifi-
38. Violent crime, as defined by the Census Bureau, includes murder, forcible
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
39. We do not have these voting data for the city sample.1274 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
cant at conventional levels in all three samples. For sewerage
spending the coefficient on ETHNIC remains virtually unchanged
from its baseline value. For the education share there is a
reduction in magnitude of the point estimate for the metro sample
but not for the county sample. In the metro sample ETHNIC is on
the cutoff point for significance at the 10 percent level, and in the
county sample it is significant at the 1 percent level. Overall, the
results on ETHNIC seem robust to controlling for state-specific
efFects.
To summarize, the results of our sensitivity analysis indicate
that the described empirical relationship between ethnic heteroge-
neity and spending on core public goods is robust to controlling for
a broad array of possible omitted variables. While the estimated
coefficient on ETHNIC changes somewhat depending upon the
specification, in most cases the estimated coefficient lies within
the 95 percent confidence interval associated with the baseline
estimate.
V. CONCLUSIONS
More ethnically diverse jurisdictions in the United States
have higher spending and higher deficits/debt per capita, and yet
devote lower shares of spending to core public goods like education
and roads. The higher spending in more ethnically diverse
jurisdictions is financed in part by higher intergovernmental
transfers rather than by local taxes. This pattern is broadly
consistent with political economy theories in which heterogeneous
and polarized societies will value public goods less, patronage
more, and will be collectively careless about fiscal discipline.
These results point to some interesting future research
questions. The issue of ethnic fragmentation is obviously related
to the problem of racial segregation, since ethnically fragmented
jurisdictions are often segregated. An important question that we
want to pursue in further research is how the negative effects of
ethnic fragmentation on public goods relate to segregation. First
of all, as we mentioned above, if ethnic fragmentation with
segregation leads to a low supply of pubUc goods (particularly
education), then the segregated disadvantaged ethnic group may
fail farther behind, perpetuating a vicious cycle. Note that public
school is not the only example of this. Wilson 11996], for instance,PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1275
notes that poor public transportation systems from inner city
ghettos to the location of job opportunities increase the costs of
finding and keeping jobs for inner city minorities. In Washington,
DC, by way of anecdote, the segments of the metro that served
poor black neighborhoods were the last (by many years) to be
completed—some are still not completed today.
Second, since ethnic fragmentation is associated with public
goods problems documented in the present paper, policy-makers
may be tempted to choose segregation and decentralization in
order to enforce relatively homogeneous communities. Benabou
|1996bl presents a model in this spirit, where stratification by
income is more efficient in the short run to deal with heterogeneity
in the production process. However, there is a second dynamic
efFect: stratification increases heterogeneity and therefore, in the
long run decreases economic efficiency. We think there are analo-
gous questions to be pursued for stratification by ethnic group.
While separation of ethnic groups may have some short-term
benefits, it may have devastating long-run costs.'"*
In summary, our results contribute to explaining why the
problem of urban public goods in America appears so difficult. The
public goods problem is linked to another problem that also
appears almost insurmountable: ethnic divisions.
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
Definitions of variables are the same in all data sets so details
on variables are given in the city section and not repeated in the
metro and county sections.
/. City Data
The city data are all downloaded electronically from the
CD-ROM version of the 1994 County and City Databook (CCD),
published by the Bureau of the Census.
40. Segregation has decreased in the last twenty years, as noted by Cutler,
Glaeser, and \^gdor 119961. It would be interesting to investigate what effect this
has had on urban public goods. One currently popular story worth testing is that
the most successful blacks are moving to the suburbs; those left in the inner city
neighborhoods are perceived as more and more different from the white mtgority
living in white neighborhoods; the ethnic polarization and the public goods
problems get even worse.1276 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Our most comprehensive city sample consists of 1083 observa-
tions. It includes the 1070 incorporated places of population
25,000 or more counted in the 1990 Census, 8 Census Designated
Areas of Hawaii (since Hawaii has no incorporated places recog-
nized by the Bureau of the Census) and the five boroughs of New
York City.**^ For consistency we treat New York City as one entity
and do not use the observations on the five boroughs since for
some of our measures the data are not provided on a breakdown
by borough basis.
We checked the data for anomalous values by sorting each
variable and examining the extreme high and low observations.
This procedure led us to exclude two anomalous observations:
Streamwood, IL, which has 0 for local government expenditure,
and Superior, WI, which has 0 for local government taxes. We
discuss the handling of other data anomalies below.
1. City government spending
The CCD data on city government spending are collected
from the 1992 Census of Governments. Expenditure includes
capital outlay and interest on debt.
As described in the Government Finance and Employment
Classification Manual, June 1992, expenditure includes anything
executed in the city budget, regardless of whether it is partly or
wholly financed by a higher level of government.
Expenditure categories given in the County and City Data-
book are Education, Health and Hospitals, Police Protection, Fire
Protection, Public Welfare, Highways, and Sewerage and Solid
Waste Management. These categories are not exhaustive, as
noted in the text of the paper.
Education includes local government-operated elementary
and secondary schools, and any universities, colleges, junior, or
community colleges operated by the local government.
Health and Hospitals includes treatment and immunization
clinics, environmental health services, ambulance services, sup-
port for private hospitals, and construction, maintenance and
operation of public hospitals.
Police includes patrols, communications, custody of persons
awaiting trial, and vehicular inspection.
41. In all our regressions we exclude two cities that have unexplained zeros
for some variables on the CD ROM, as explained next: Streamwood, IL, and
Superior, WI.PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1277
Waste Management includes sanitary and storm sewers,
sewage disposal, street cleaning, pickup, and disposal of garbage.
Some functions are usually executed by other levels of
government and so appear with zero spending in many cities.
Education spending, for example, has 866 zeros out of 1020
observations (the New England states and Virginia account for
almost all of positive education spending by cities). Education is
usually executed by counties or special school districts, and so
does not pass through the city budget. Likewise, health and
hospitals has 306 zeros out of 1020, and welfare has 750 zeros out
of 1020. We did not run regressions for expenditure variables with
a majority of zeros.
Even spending on seemingly unavoidable city government
functions is sometimes not assigned to cities. To take a random
example, Bowie, MD, a suburb of Washington, DC, shows zero
spending on police. Bowie does not have its own eity police force;
crime victims in Bowie summon the Prince George's County police
instead. (This problem is not that serious for police spending:
there is only one other zero police observation in the sample.) Fire
and waste management also have some zeros (65 and 77, respec-
tively, out of 1020 observations).
The (hopefully random) way in which different kinds of
expenditures are assigned or not assigned to different levels in
different cities will introduce some noise into the other puhlic
spending share dependent variables. As we discuss in the text, we
use data sets at different levels of aggregation in part to make
sure that the results do not depend on arbitrary expenditure
assignment between levels.
The electronic data for expenditure and taxes per capita on
the CD ROM did not match the printed version in the CCD, and
included some absurdly high values. When we recalculated the
per capita figures from aggregate spending and population data,
the calculated values came close to reproducing the printed values
in the CCD and stayed within a plausible range.
Intergovernmental revenue per capita includes amounts re-
ceived from other governments as fiseal aid in the form of shared
revenues and grants-in-aid, as reimbursements for performance
of general government activities and for specific services for
paying government (e.g., care of prisoners or contractual re-
search) or in lieu of taxes. Excludes amounts received from other
governments for sale of property, commodities, and utility services.1278 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2. Ethnic classification data
1990 Census data are reported according to how people
identify themselves on a list that includes Black, American
Indian, Asian, White, and Other Hispanic is not a mutually
exclusive category with the other ethnic classifications, since
Hispanics can be of any race. Other in the above list seems to
proxy for Hispanic, as the two have a correlation of 0.91.
5. Educational attainment
Educational attainment (BAGRAD) is from a sample of
persons 25 years and over and is carried out in the 1990 census.
4. Income data
Data on income in 1989 were collected during the 1990 census
from a sample of persons fifteen years old and over. Money income
includes wage or salary income, self-employment income, interest
dividends, social security benefits, welfare income, and retire-
ment income. The definition of Household is all persons who
occupy a housing unit, defined as a house, apartment, mobile
home, or a single room occupied as separate living quarters.
//. Metro Areas
The metro data are downloaded from the 1994 CD ROMs
called the City and County Compendium (CCC) and City and
County Plus (CCP), which are an expanded electronic version of
the publication City and County Extra, by Slater Hall Information
Products.
The metro sample includes all Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs) and Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs)
from the City and County Extra of Slater Hall Information
Products, Inc. The minimum size for metropolitan area is 50,000.
The metro data aggregate all levels of local government in the
metro area, including county, school district, other local district,
and city.
PMSAs are MSAs that form part of a larger Consolidated
Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA). Baltimore and Washington
PMSAs together make up the Baltimore-Washington CMSA, forPUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DTVISIONS 1279
example. We decided that PMSAs are likely to he closer than
CMSAs to the concept of regional political economy that we
wished to capture.
The definition of MSA includes a generous definition of the
urban hinterland. The Washington DC PMSA, for example,
includes Montgomery, Prince George's, Frederick, Charles, and
Calvert Counties in Maryland; Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax,
Loudon, Prince William, Stafford, Clarke, Warren, Fauquier,
Culpeper, Spotsylvania, and King George Counties in Virginia;
and Berkeley and Jefferson Counties in West Virginia. This makes
the metro data in general more aggregated than the county data.
We checked the data for anomalous ohservations by sorting
each variahle and examining the high and low values. This
procedure leads us to exclude Honolulu, which strangely has a
zero value for education spending, and New York City, which has
extreme values for expenditure and taxes per capita (3.5 and 3.3
times larger than the second largest ohservations, respectively).
Although many might helieve that taxes and spending are ex-
treme in the Big Apple, we found that the population hase imphcit
in this extreme figure in the data diverged from the reported
population by a factor of 3. >
We excluded the local deht per capita ohservation for RICH-
LAND-KENNEWICK-PASCO, WA (MSA), because it is larger hy
a factor of 4 than the second largest ohservation. We have the
vague memory that there is a public utility nuclear plant boon-
doggle going on here, hut we have not checked it out further.
The expenditure share data include classification for spend-
ing in the following categories: education, health and hospitals,
police, welfare, and roads. The only one of these categories with
some zero observations was welfare (18 zeros out of 307 observa-
tions). As in the other data sets, these categories are not exhaustive.
///. County Data
The county data are also downloaded from the 1994 CD
ROMs called the City and County Compendium (CCC) and City
and County Plus (CCP) by Slater Hall Information Products. The
county data aggregate all levels of government located in the
county—city, school district, county, and any other.
These data cover the full 3140 counties in the United States.
Some of the counties are thinly populated—the minimum in the1280 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
sample for population in 1990 is 52. As explained in the text, we
decided to focus on "urhan" counties hecause of our focus on urhan
puhhc goods. We therefore chose counties with populations ahove
25,000, the same population minimum the CCD uses for cities.
This reduced the sample to 1462 counties.
As with the other data sets, we checked for anomalies by
sorting each variable and examining extreme values. We noticed
systematic problems with sample observations in Virginia—many
have zero spending on core local goverament functions hke roads
and education.
Further investigation revealed that Virginia (alone among
the 50 states) has independent cities listed separately, which
messes up data reporting. For example, hoth Fairfax City and
Fairfax County are listed with their own data for all concepts. If,
for example, the Fairfax County road authority handles the roads
for hoth city and county, and the Fairfax city school hoard handles
the education for hoth city and county, then there will be a zero
entry for road spending in Fairfax city and for education spending
in Fairfax county. Not knowing how to resolve this prohlem, we
wound up omitting all data for Virginia.
Counties in Hawaii were anomalously zero or near zero for
education spending, just as Honolulu's education spending was
strangely zero in the metro data. We omitted counties in Hawaii
from the data set.
The other data anomaly that we noticed and corrected was
that federal expenditure per capita was listed as zero for four
counties in New York City—New York County itself, the Bronx,
Queens, and Richmond. This would imply that there were no
federal judges or welfare recipients in New York City, which
contradicts conventional wisdom. A check of the published source
revealed that these data were not reported because of a prohlem of
assigning expenditure hetween these counties within New York
City. We substituted NAs for the zeros.
The county data, like the metro data, include classification for
spending in the following categories: education, health and hospi-
tals, police, welfare, and roads. In the sample that we used, two of
these categories still showed some zero entries, probahly reflect-
ing assignment of these functions to higher levels of government.
There were 207 zeros out of a sample of 1386 observations in
welfare and 13 zeros out of 1386 for health and hospitals.PUBLIC GOODS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS 1281
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